By Dr. Kariuki Muigua, PhD (Leading Environmental Law Scholar, Policy Advisor, Natural Resources Lawyer and Dispute Resolution Expert from Kenya), Winner of Kenya’s ADR Practitioner of the Year 2021, ADR Publisher of the Year 2021 and CIArb (Kenya) Lifetime Achievement Award 2021*
It has been argued that African governments should maximize foreign investments by: eliminating corruption; improving safety and security; strengthening macroeconomic environment, investing in quality education and skill development in science, technology and innovation; and avoiding a ‘race to the bottom’ syndrome, that gives unnecessary tax holidays and waivers to foreign companies. However, some African states such as South Africa have already started terminating their International Investment Agreements (IIAs) in favour of more favourable dispute settlement forums, such as State-State arbitration. Thus, while some states decide to opt out of ISDS system in favour of domestic courts or regional bodies, others prefer initiating reforms to their obligations under IIAs.
Some authors have suggested that some of the ways in which ISDS can be made more responsive to the concerns raised would be making the system more transparent, forming a clear standard of review, and establishing a permanent arbitration forum or creating an appellate mechanism in order to strike a balance between investment protection and protecting the host states’ right to regulate. The appellate mechanism especially would be useful in addressing the concern regarding substantive inconsistency between arbitral decisions in investment treaty arbitration.
The mechanism of allowing private investors to submit investment claims to international arbitration has come under increasing public scrutiny, with several actors criticizing its lack of legitimacy. UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2019 has also pointed out that Investor– State arbitration continues to be controversial, spurring debate in the investment and development community and the public at large. As a result, it has identified five principal approaches which have emerged from IIAs signed in 2018: (i) no ISDS, (ii) a standing ISDS tribunal, (iii) limited ISDS, (iv) improved ISDS procedures and (v) an unreformed ISDS mechanism. While it may not be possible yet to for African countries to agree on a single approach to these reforms, countries have these options to choose from while negotiating their IIAs with foreigners depending on their negotiating power, concerns and development needs.
‘Africanization’ of International Investment Law: Pan-African Investment Code
In addition to the reform efforts going at the international arena, there have been efforts by the African Union aimed at what has come to be popularly known as ‘Africanization’ of international investment law. The first step towards this was evidenced by the drafting of Pan-African Investment Code, whose main objective is to promote, facilitate and protect investments that foster the sustainable development of each Member State, and in particular, the Member State where the investment is located. The Code is meant to apply as a guiding instrument to Member States as well as investors and their investments in the territory of Member States as defined by this Code.
In addition, this Code is meant define the rights and obligations of Member States as well as investors, and principles prescribed therein. The Pan-African Investment Code is hailed as the first continent-wide African model investment treaty elaborated under the auspices of the African Union, drafted from the perspective of developing and least-developed countries with a view to promote sustainable development. In an attempt to make investment activities by foreigners more responsive to the sustainable development needs of African states, the Code has introduced some of innovative features such as the reformulation of traditional investment treaty provisions and the introduction of direct obligations for investors. If adopted, this Code could potentially contribute to the reforms of the international and regional investment regimes.
‘Africanization’ of International Investment Law: Regional Dispute Settlement Bodies
Some commentators within the Continent have also proposed that setting up of regional courts is the way to go. For instance, in relation to the West African region, it has been suggested that for States in West Africa there might already exist a ready-made investment tribunal in the form of the Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). To the proponents of this position, all that is required is to activate the arbitral jurisdiction of the ECOWAS Court of Justice, considered the most successful of the African sub-regional courts, and extend its jurisdiction to cover investorstate jurisdiction. This, it has been argued, given the present widespread dissatisfaction with investor–State dispute settlement, can provide an alternative to arbitration that is already up and running and would also help to cement African States’ role as ‘investment rule-makers’ rather than ‘ruletakers’. This approach may also be duplicated in relation to the other regional courts such as the East African Court of Justice.
Currently, the African countries trade in terms of blocks, with States forming Regional Economic Communities (RECs) such as the East African Community (EAC), Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Southern African Development Community (SADC). The debate is still ongoing with emergence of discourse on a possibility of a continental approach to the investment debate with the drafting of such instruments as the Pan African Investment Code157 and the African Continental Free Trade Agreement.
Capacity Building in Investment Negotiation Knowledge and Expertise
While some commentators often argue that the lopsided relations in investment law negotiations that characterise the developed-developing world relations, others have argued that in contrast to North-South relations, negotiation outcomes seem to be shaped more by expert knowledge than by power asymmetries. This, they have argued, is evidenced by a situation where powerful states like Egypt fail to dominate negotiations, while small island-state Mauritius with its strategic investment policy agenda succeeds in setting the terms of investment agreements. It has been observed that the foreign companies operating in Africa often have high bargaining power in the negotiations due to their influential position and backing from their governments. On the other hand, African governments have low bargaining power in these contracts or agreements because they are less influential. They are more flexible in negotiations than their foreign counterparts. In exchange, they end up giving what rightfully belongs to the people to foreigners. There is a need for African countries to fight corruption, which often affect these negotiations and enforcement of domestic laws.
The World Investment Report 2018 outlines challenges arising from the policymaking interaction between IIAs and the national legal framework for investment as follows: policymakers in charge of national and international investment policies might be operating in silos and create outcomes that are not mutually supportive or, worse, conflicting; incoherence (e.g. between a clearly defined Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) clause in one or several IIAs and a broad FET clause in an investment law) may have the effect of rendering IIA reform ineffective; and incoherence between investment laws and IIAs may also create Investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)-related risks when national laws include advance consent to international arbitration as the means for the settlement of investor-State disputes, which could result in parallel proceedings.
It has also been observed that post-2000, investors have increasingly relied on expansive interpretations of vaguely-drafted provisions in IIAs, national investment laws, investment contracts, and the dispute resolution provisions contained within such agreements, to sue host states for alleged violations of treaty or contractual obligations. This practice of “contract, treaty and forum shopping” has contributed to the multiplication of ISDS cases. In addition, litigants place their court cases in the court system perceived most likely to find in their favour, thus affecting the legitimacy of the whole ISDS system.166 There is therefore a need for the African Governments to invest in highly knowledgeable experts while negotiating and drafting the terms of investment agreements in order to ensure that the resultant documents are not only non-ambiguous but also guarantee that they do not adversely affect their ability to regulate the investment activities and enforcement of domestic laws.
*This article is an extract from the Book: Settling Disputes Through Arbitration in Kenya, 4th Edition, Glenwood Publishers, Nairobi, 2022 by Dr. Kariuki Muigua, PhD, Kenya’s ADR Practitioner of the Year 2021 (Nairobi Legal Awards), ADR Publisher of the Year 2021 and ADR Lifetime Achievement Award 2021 (CIArb Kenya). Dr. Kariuki Muigua is a foremost Environmental Law and Natural Resources Lawyer and Scholar, Sustainable Development Advocate and Conflict Management Expert in Kenya. Dr. Kariuki Muigua is a Senior Lecturer of Environmental Law and Dispute resolution at the University of Nairobi School of Law and The Center for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP). He has published numerous books and articles on Environmental Law, Environmental Justice Conflict Management, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Sustainable Development. Dr. Muigua is also a Chartered Arbitrator, an Accredited Mediator, the Africa Trustee of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and the Managing Partner of Kariuki Muigua & Co. Advocates. Dr. Muigua is recognized among the top 5 leading lawyers and dispute resolution experts in Kenya by the Chambers Global Guide 2022.
References
Muigua, K., Settling Disputes Through Arbitration in Kenya, 4th Edition, Glenwood Publishers, Nairobi, 2022, p. 322 to 328.