By Dr. Kariuki Muigua, PhD (Leading Environmental Law Scholar, Policy Advisor, Natural Resources Lawyer and Dispute Resolution Expert from Kenya), Winner of Kenya’s ADR Practitioner of the Year 2021, ADR Publication of the Year 2021 and CIArb (Kenya) Lifetime Achievement Award 2021*
Regulation of ADR is a subject wrought with contentious discourse. There are those who strongly advocate for ADR to be deregulated, while others argue for strong state regulation. On one end, the legislation of ADR carries with it the advantages of encouraging its adoption nationally; establishing standards of ADR practitioner’s competence; developing systems of compliance and complaints;[1] addressing weaknesses of ADR such as ensuring the fairness of the procedure and building capacity and coherence of the ADR field. Proponents of regulation have argued that regulation of ADR will increase the use and demand of services and create or enhance an ADR “market”.[2] There are those who believe that the regulation of ADR may have its value in assuring that the parties employ qualified, neutral and skilled mediators and arbitrators in resolving a wide variety of disputes. However, this is countered by the argument that in mediation where the parties select private non-government mediators, monitoring is complimented by the fact that the parties share in the compensation of such neutrals, better assuring their freedom from bias.[3]
This assertion may be relevant to Kenya considering that private mediators are also appointed and compensated the same way. It is therefore possible to argue that the mediator may be compelled by this fact to act fairly. Contention would, however, arise where there are allegations of corruption. It is not clear, at least in Kenya, how the parties would deal with the same. This is because, unlike in arbitration where parties may seek court’s intervention in setting aside the otherwise binding arbitral award, mediation award is non-binding and wholly relies on the goodwill of the parties to respect the same. Therefore, faced with the risk of corruption and the potential non-acceptance of the outcome by the parties, it is arguable that the foregoing argument of the compensation being a sufficient incentive may not be satisfactory. This may, arguably, call for better mechanisms of safeguarding the parties’ interests.
In arbitration, the argument advanced is that whether of interests or rights disputes, the same process of joint selection and joint funding coupled with mutual selection of neutral from a tried and experienced cadre of professional arbitrators further assures their independence and neutrality, with protection of their integrity as their only ticket to future designations.[4] Again, the issue of independent practitioners would arise. For instance, in Kenya, there has been increased number of professionals taking up ADR. Professional bodies and higher institutions of learning have increased their rate of teaching ADR, as professional course and academic course respectively. The net effect of this will be increased number of ADR practitioners in the country.
As part of professional development, not all of those who get the academic qualifications may enroll with the local institutions for certification as practitioners. There are also those who may obtain foreign qualifications and later seek such certification. However, there are those who are not affiliated to any institution or body. In such instances, it would only be hoped that they would conduct themselves in a professional manner, bearing in mind that any misconduct or unfair conduct may lead to setting aside of the award or even removal as an arbitrator by the High Court. The court process obviously comes with extra costs and it would probably have been more effective to have a supervisory body or institution to report the unscrupulous practitioner for action, without necessarily involving the court. Such instances may thus justify the need for formal regulation, especially for the more formal mechanisms.
Currently, there are attempts to make referral to ADR mandatory in Kenya. This is especially evidenced by the gazetted Mediation (Pilot Project) Rules, 2015, which provide that every civil action instituted in court after commencement of these Rules, must be subjected to mandatory screening by the Mediation Deputy Registrar and those found suitable and may be referred to mediation.[5] Thus, there is no choice as to whether one may submit the matters voluntarily or otherwise. While this may promote the use of mediation where the parties are generally satisfied with the outcome, the opposite may also be true. Caution ought to be exercised in balancing the need for facilitating expeditious access to justice through ADR and retaining the positive aspects of the processes. For instance, in other jurisdictions where there is provision for mandatory promotion of ADR processes, the use of those processes has not necessarily become common.[6]
Among the reasons given for this reluctance towards the adoption of ADR include lack of education and training in the field, lack of court-connected programs, whether voluntary or mandated and insufficient legislation. The argument is thus made that when introducing ADR for the first time, there may be a need for some element of compulsion or legislative control, as this can support its growth.18 This is the path that the Kenyan Judiciary has taken. The Judiciary mediation programme is still on a trial basis and the outcome will inform future framework or direction. The pilot program (having been rolled out to other stations outside Nairobi in May 2018) will define how the practitioners as well as the general public perceive court-annexed mediation and ADR in general. It is therefore important that the concerned drivers of this project use the opportunity to promote educational programming, with the efforts including workshops and seminars among the local practicing lawyers to enhance their understanding of ADR and the services provided by the pilot project. This, it is argued, may enable them to assist their clients in making informed decisions about whether or not to use ADR.[7]
On the other end, it has been argued that legislative regulation, no matter how well meaning, inevitably limits and restrains.[8] The regulation of ADR is feared to hamper its advantages. The developing country’s experience with court-annexed ADR indicates that when a judge imposes a conciliator or mediator on the parties, it does not provide the proper incentive for the parties to be candid about the case. ADR advantages such as low cost, procedural flexibility, enhanced access for marginalized groups and a predictable forum for conflict management tend to disappear when there is discretionary power with court personnel, procedural formalities within the ADR process or an artificial limit to competition within the ADR market. Court mandated mediation has been argued to negate the fundamental aspects of voluntariness and party control that distinguish it from litigation, the very aspects attributed to its success in a vast number of cases.[9]
In addition, the “one size fits all” approach taken by legislation that encourages or requires all to use ADR, without regard to needs in various contexts and to the distinctions among the various processes, is another reason why ADR legislation should be undertaken with caution.[10] For instance, in the Kenyan situation, while the Mediation (Pilot Project) Rules, 2015 require screening of civil matters for possible submission for mediation, it is possible for the Registrar to realise that some of the cases may be appropriate for arbitration instead of mediation. The programme only takes care of mediation process with no reference to arbitration or any other process, well, apart from litigation.[11]
The question that would, therefore, arise is whether the Registrar has powers to force parties into arbitration as well. Further, if they have such powers, the next question would be who would pay for the process, bearing in mind that it is potentially cost-effective but may be expensive as well. On the other hand, if the Registrar lacks such powers, it is also a question worth addressing what the Court would do if it ordered the parties to resort to arbitration but both parties fail to do so due to such factors as costs. It is, therefore, worth considering whether the Mediation Accreditation Committee, established under the Civil Procedure Act,[12] should have its mandate expanded to deal with all processes, or whether there should be set up another body to deal with the other processes.[13]
*This article is an extract from the Article Regulating Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Practice in Kenya: Looking into the Future, 10(1) Alternative Dispute Resolution Journal, p. 1 by Dr. Kariuki Muigua, PhD, Kenya’s ADR Practitioner of the Year 2021 (Nairobi Legal Awards), ADR Publisher of the Year 2021 and ADR Lifetime Achievement Award 2021 (CIArb Kenya). Dr. Kariuki Muigua is a foremost Environmental Law and Natural Resources Lawyer and Scholar, Sustainable Development Advocate and Conflict Management Expert in Kenya. Dr. Kariuki Muigua is a Senior Lecturer of Environmental Law and Dispute resolution at the University of Nairobi School of Law and The Center for Advanced Studies in Environmental Law and Policy (CASELAP). He has published numerous books and articles on Environmental Law, Environmental Justice Conflict Management, Alternative Dispute Resolution and Sustainable Development. Dr. Muigua is also a Chartered Arbitrator, an Accredited Mediator, the Africa Trustee of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators and the Managing Partner of Kariuki Muigua & Co. Advocates. Dr. Muigua is recognized as one of the leading lawyers and dispute resolution experts by the Chambers Global Guide 2022.
References.
[1] Robert, J.M., ‘Florida’s Experience with Dispute Resolution Regulation: Too much of a Good Thing?’ Florida Conflict Resolution Consortium, available at http://consensus.fsu.edu/ADR/PDFS/FloridaADR.pdf [Accessed on 26/02/2022].
[2] Zack AM, ‘The Regulation of ADR: A Silent Presence at the Collective Bargaining Table,’ p.4, Seventh Annual Conference of the ABA Dispute Resolution Section Los Angeles, California, April 15, 2005, available at http://www .law.harvard.edu/programs/lwp/people/staffPapers/zack/The%20Regulation%20of %20ADR-ABA%207 th%20conference.pdf [Accessed on 26/02/2022].
[3] Zack AM, Ibid.
[4] Zack AM, Ibid.
[5] Mediation (Pilot Project) Rules, 2015, Rule 4(1).
[6] Leon, J.A.R, ‘Why Further Development of ADR in Latin America Makes Sense: The Venezuelan Model’, Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 5, No. 2, (2005).
[7] Muigua, K., “Enhancing The Court Annexed Mediation Environment in Kenya,” A Paper Presented at the 2nd NCIA International Arbitration Conference held from 4th to 6th March 2020 in Mombasa, Kenya; Available at: http://kmco.co.ke/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Enhancing-The-Court-Annexed-Mediation-Environment-in-Kenya-00000002.pdf.
[8] Bryan, K. & Weinstein, M., ‘The Case against Misdirected Regulation of ADR,’ Dispute Resolution Magazine, (Spring, 2013).
[9] Hedeen, T., “Coercion and Self-determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But Some Are More Voluntary than Others,” The Justice System Journal Vol. 26, No. 3 (2005), pp. 273-291.
[10] Spencer D, ‘Court given power to order ADR in civil actions’ (2000) 38(9) Law Society Journal 71 at 72; NADRAC, above note 3 (as referenced in Green, Cameron, ‘Where did the ‘alternative’ go? Why Mediation should not be a Mandatory Step in the Litigation Process, DR Bulletin, Vol. 12, No. 3, Art. 2, 2010.
[11] Muigua, K., Ibid.
[12] S. 59A, S.59B, Cap 21, Laws of Kenya.
[13] Muigua, K., Ibid.